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This paper analyzes the political economy of regulatory and judicial appointment rules. I 
study a model of price-setting by a political principal faced with a firm with unknown costs, 
and endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency rises with the 
effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set-up captures 
the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward 
election rather than appointment of regulators are more likely the less efficient is the 
information-gathering technology, the less stringent are the investment concerns of society, 
the stronger are regulators’ revolving-door motivations, and the closer is political 
competition. These predictions are consistent with US electric power market data. 
Moreover, in accordance with the model, electricity rates are lower and respond less to 
shock in input costs in states that elect their regulators or their High Court judges. 
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Understanding which institutional settings are more efficient in inducing public 
officials to act in the public interest is a key issue in political economy. A crucial 
institution is the procedure of selecting representatives and, in particular, whether 
to elect or appoint regulators and judges. While the features linked to these two 
constitutional designs have been considered as independent and analyzed, one at a 
time, in order to clarify the differences between appointment regimes, there are 
several markets where regulation is undertaken by the two types of public 
officials at the same time, and a plurality of selection methods survive.  
The US electric power market (along with other US markets) is a case in point. 
Prices are set by an independent staff at the end of public hearings presided by 
regulators and judges, who can either be appointed or elected. Such a framework 
is not unique to the US and, in the aftermath of the recent European and South-
American privatizations, a rising need for higher transparency of the regulatory 
process has exported beyond American boundaries a similar combination of 
independent staffs and accountable top-level regulators and judges (see Newbery, 
2000).
1 This rich institutional design raises three key questions. First, what are the 
forces driving the adoption of a particular appointment rule? Second, how do the 
incentives, imposed by selection rules on regulators and judges, interact with each 
other and with task-specific motivations? Third, what is the overall impact of 
judicial and regulatory appointment rules on the efficiency of regulatory policies? 
                                                 
1The UK is a case in point. The Utilities Act of 2000 entrusted the regulation of electricity and gas 
to officials (GEMA) appointed by the Secretary of State and supported by an independent staff 
(Ofgem), which proposes the policy position and is subject to judicial review (OECD, 2002).    3
This paper lays out a framework for thinking about these issues and explores their 
empirical implications by using US electricity market data. The model bridges the 
canonical principal-agent theory of regulation (Laffont, 2000) to a recent body of 
political economics literature contrasting elected and appointed officials from a 
normative as well as a positive perspective.
2 I study the price-setting problem of a 
principal faced with a monopoly with unknown costs. The principal is endowed 
with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency rises with the effort 
exerted by a regulator and a judge, whom hereafter I shall call supervisors. 
Supervisors respond to implicit (or accountability) incentives and intrinsic (or 
legacy) motivations. Implicit incentives force supervisors to select effort looking 
at the ballot box (the preferences of their professional peers) if elected (appointed) 
but not at the pricing rule selected by the principal. The model predicts that, under 
a mild condition on the common random ability, elected supervisors exert more 
effort than appointed ones. This election-driven populist (or pandering) drift is 
complementary to that proposed by Besley and Coate (2003). The latter claim 
that, by unbundling policy issues, election reduces the influence of industry 
interests. Also, the pandering incentives I identify are fuelled (curbed) by judges’ 
fairness motivations (regulators’ desire to obtain job offers from the industry).  
Increasing the equilibrium effort, election decreases the expected probability that 
the planner remains uninformed. This leads to lower expected rates. So election is 
undoubtedly better than appointment from a static efficiency point of view. Yet, if 
investment concerns enter the picture, the comparison between the two methods 
                                                 
2 The two most relevant contributions in this literature are the comparison between accountable 
and nonaccountable public agents proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2007) and the Maskin and 
Tirole’s (2004) analysis of career and legacy concerns in politics.   4
becomes uncertain. Indeed, I show that, if the regulatory selection rule is chosen 
by one of two political parties, investment concerns and the avoidance of the 
distortions created by the funding of investment aids are complementary in 
enhancing the likelihood of a reform toward appointment. Besides, the latter is 
sensitive to the tightness of the political competition. 
Consistent with the model’s prediction, state-level panel data from the US electric 
power market confirm that reforms toward election of regulators are associated 
with less abundant regulatory resources, less expensive generation, and closer 
political competition. I also find evidence that rates are lower and respond less to 
cost shocks in states electing their regulators or their High Court judges. 
There are three main contributions by this paper. First, following the footsteps of 
a lively literature on endogenous political institutions (Aghion et al., 2004; Aidt 
and Giovannoni, 2005), I identify the normative and positive determinants of 
regulatory regime reforms.
3 To this extent, the evidence confirms the basic idea, 
proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2008), that appointment outperforms election 
if time inconsistency (in this case, in investment) is a real issue. 
Second, the empirical analysis adds significantly to the literature about the 
systematic differences in the policies pursued by appointed and elected officials.
4 
                                                 
3 Hanssen (2004a) provides a first empirical and theoretical account of the relation among political 
strategic dynamics and institutional reforms. Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2006) and Falaschetti 
(2007) provide some evidence from regulatory data of the relevance of the forces identified in the 
present paper. Enikolopov (2007) performs the same exercise on US local governments.  
4 Besley and Coate (2003) review a first cross-sectional tradition analyzing the US electric power 
market, and report, for the first time, panel evidence confirming the idea that states electing their 
regulators enjoy lower rates. Leaver (2004), Holburn and Spiller (2002), and Fremeth and Holburn 
(2007) report similar evidence employing panels of rate reviews.    5
In contrast to previous studies, not only I endogenize the choice of selection rules 
but I also consider judicial appointment as a possible determinant of prices.
5 To 
this extent, my results constitute one of the first accounts of the relation between 
judicial institutions and regulatory policies (see also Besley and Payne, 2005). 
Third, the paper is complementary to a recent interesting literature explaining the 
use of regulation as opposed to independent courts as a function of the incentives 
faced by judges and regulators themselves (Glaeser et al., 2001).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the 
institutions governing the pricing process in the US electric power market as an 
example of the general setting studied in the model. Section 3 clarifies the effect 
of supervisors’ incentives and motivations on regulated rates. Section 4 studies 
the efficiency and strategic determinants of regulatory reforms. Section 5 presents 
the empirical work. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs, tables and a detailed 
description of the data are gathered in the Appendix. 
 
2. Institutions 
Investor-owned electric power utilities (IOUs hereafter) account for over three-
fourths of the electricity sales of the US electricity market. While jurisdiction over 
both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies with a federal body–– 
the FERC, retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs 
hereafter). The latter deal with several markets (telecommunications, natural gas, 
                                                 
5 The empirical test in Falaschetti (2007) is a first attempt to endogenize regulatory rules. Besley 
and Payne (2005) and Hanssen (2000) show that states appointing judges have respectively fewer 
discrimination charges and higher litigation rates. Helland and Tabarrok (2002) show that elected 
judges redistribute wealth from out-of-state businesses to in-state plaintiffs (i.e., voters).   6
insurance, water, etc.) and perform several tasks (for example, they suggest lines 
of conduct on service provision, design environmental regulations and so on), 
among which price-setting is the most relevant. IOUs are not allowed to receive 
government subsidies and, therefore, regulated two-part tariffs should cover 
average costs in order to assure the firms’ viability. As a consequence, rates have 
traditionally been linked to those average costs recognized as reimbursable during 
rate reviews. The latter are generally triggered by utilities in response to cost 
shocks, and sometimes initiated periodically by the PUC (Friedman, 1991). 
Two-tier hearings and supervisors’ roles.–– Rate reviews follow a precise routine 
composed of two levels of formal quasi-judicial hearings open to all interested 
parties (firms; ratepayers, along with their state-funded advocates; PUC staff; 
interest groups, etc).
6 First, commissioners––the heads of the PUCs––sit on the 
bench; next, if the filing is not approved or some party finds him/herself 
mistreated, a High Court judge (usually sitting in a state supreme court) is asked 
to rule the case. The appeal is on law and fact and “with so much at stake, 
[judicial review] is a very real possibility” (Gormley, 1983).  
A huge body of press testimonies and empirical results highlights the critical and 
often undervalued relevance of judicial review. As Gormley (1983) reports, the 
appellate rate of PUC decisions reached between 1974 and 1979 the considerably 
mean level of 37.4 percent (with a 1976 peak of 52.3 percent),
7 and that the share 
of partially reversed cases was 43.5 percent. Teske et al. (2004, ch. 15) report 
                                                 
6 Here, I follow Friedman (1991, pp. 92 – 98), CDRA (1992, pp. 52 – 68) and Gormley (1983, pp. 
92 – 98) whose overviews are highly consistent with those available on the PUCs’ websites. 
7 As noticed by Hanssen (2004a), the share of appealed decisions underestimates the “activist” 
judges’ effect, being the likelihood of an appeal itself a function of judges’ incentives.   7
similar figures for the period 1995-1996, when the mean appellate rate was thirty-
six percent and the share of partially reversed cases thirty-five percent. During the 
hearings, the role of commissioners and judges is one of supervision: they 
examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence and interpret prevailing 
precedents and regulations.
8 The final motion to be approved, instead, is proposed 
de facto by the PUC’s staff, who act as the jury in a typical Anglo-American 
adversarial trial––the reason being that decisions should always be reached in “an 
open and fair manner” (CDRA, 1992).
9 This latter feature, along with the fact that 
the complete record of the hearings is widely publicized and all interested parties 
participate, assures that only if “hard” evidence––such that “every interested party 
can convince himself that [the judgment] corresponds to the true state of the 
world” (Laffont, 2000)––is obtained does the review end.  
Accordingly, I set up a model in which rates are selected by a planner obtaining 
orthogonal and truthful signals on the firm’s technology from the search activity of 
a regulator and a judge. This fictional planner represents the Coasian bargaining 
among interested players necessary to make price changes acceptable. 
Supervisors’ incentives.–– Media carefully track the evolution of electricity files, 
which in turn represent some of the most advertised tasks over which regulators 
and judges are selected. High (state supreme and circuit) court judges and public 
                                                 
8 “The judge just listens attentively. If it speaks, it will be to rule, at the request of the party or on 
his own motion, on the admissibility of a question put to a witness or a party or to ensure 
adherence to the rules of the game” (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, pp. 272–273). 
9 Commissioners consider the staff as the most influential hearing actor (Gormley, 1983; Teske et 
al., 2004, ch. 4). While a part (trial staff) suggests a pre-hearing position, another (advisory staff) 
proposes the final motion (CDRA, 1992). Furthermore, courts usually examine the staff before 
issuing the judgment (Gormley, 1983).   8
utility commissioners are either elected or appointed, and appointment rules are 
reformed at the state government level. Coherently, I assume that supervisors are 
rewarded on the basis of the extent of hard information (reported in the docket 
official papers) they obtain during the hearings. In addition, I model the role of 
selection rules and of regulatory and judiciary specific motivations in the pricing 
process. Finally, I also posit that selection rules are chosen by political parties 
faced with election uncertainty. 
 
3. Accountable Supervisors and Regulated Rates 
Building on the institutions introduced above, the model takes its approach from 
Laffont (2000) and incorporates a (possibly partisan) planner and two implicitly 
and intrinsically motivated supervisors. 
 
3.1 The Basic Model 
Preferences and Information.–– The regulated firm produces a variable scale 
product  q, charging a two-part tariff  A pq +  with q,  A and  p being strictly 
positive. Total cost is  q θ . The marginal cost θ  is equal to θ  with probability v 
and to θ  with probability 1 v − . Let  0 θθθ Δ ≡−>. Consumers share the same 
preferences, and the demand is that of a representative consumer. Let  () Sq, 
p= () () P qS q ′ = ,  () qD p =  and  ( ) ( ) Rq Pqq A = +  label the gross surplus, inverse and 
regular demand functions, and the firm’s revenue. Consumers choose q to 
maximize the net surplus  ( ) Sq A p q −−  and  A is fixed optimally to make them 
indifferent between buying or not: that is,  ( ) ( ) A Sq Pqq ≡− . The firm’s utility is   9
Ut q θ =−  and a reservation level of 0 is required. The firm’s revenues must cover 
managerial rewards t and, thus,  ( ) Ap q p t + ≥ .  
The planner’s problem.–– Ex post social welfare W  is the sum of the net 
consumer surplus and of the firm’s utility. The firm’s budget constraint is 
evaluated at the shadow price of the managerial rewards 1 λ +  and,
 consequently,
  
() () () ( ) ( ) 1 WS q p Ap q pU Ap q pt λ =− − + + + + − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦.                                           () 1  
Let  ( ) Vq denotes the social surplus brought about by the production of q. Given 
that the good is private, V  is the sum of the consumers’ net surplus plus the 
firm’s revenue, computed at the shadow price 1 λ +  (because it helps to fulfill the 
firm’s budget constraint). So,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 Vq Sq Rq Rq Sq λλ =−+ + = +  with  () 0 V  
0 = ,  0 V′> ,  0 V′′ < .
10 The strictly concave planner’s objective in ( ) 1  re-writes as: 
()( ) 1 WV q q U λ θλ =− +− .                                                                                     () 2   
Under complete information about θ the planner achieves the optimal allocation 
()( )
* 1 Vq λ θ ′ =+  
and no rent is left to the firm (see the Appendix). Instead, under 
asymmetric information, the planner offers the firm a menu of incentive 
compatible pairs ( ) , tq trading off informational rent extraction and allocative 
distortion.
11 Let  () () { } ,, , ,, tq U tq U
 
denote managerial rewards, output and utility of 
                                                 
10 Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) suggest that  A here covers a role similar to the governmental 
transfers in Laffont and Tirole (1993). Thus, my analysis is formally similar to the latter when 
reimbursement is intended operated through regulated prices. In the present case, the shadow cost 
of public funds is replaced by the marginal deadweight loss from a rise in the fixed fee. 
11 Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for firm θ (θ ) is the one preferred 
by θ (θ ) in the menu of () , tq pairs or: tq tq θ θ −≥ −  ( ) _ ICH   and    tq tq θ θ −≥ −  ( ) _ ICL .   10
the high and low-cost firms. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality 
implies a binding high cost firm’s individual rationality constraint  
0 Ut q θ =− =,                                                                                             ( ) _ IR L  
and a binding low cost firm’s incentive compatibility constraint 
Ut qU q q q θ θθ θ =− = + − = Δ .                                                                 ( ) _ IC H  
Thus, under asymmetric information, expected social welfare is  
()() () ()( ) 11 1 Wv V q q q v V q q λ θλ θ λ θ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − Δ + − − + ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
% .                                             () 3  
Except for the expected rent vq λ θ Δ , the problem is the same as in ( ) 2 . To assure 
incentive compatibility, the planner grants an informational rent to the low cost 
firm (whose allocation is still optimal) and distorts the high cost firm’s allocation. 
Define  ( ) ( ) 1 x xx Γ≡ −  with  0 ′ Γ> . The low cost firm contract is now given by  





λ λθ λ θ λθ λ θ ′′ =+ =+ + Δ =+ + Γ Δ
−
.                            () 4  
The first term in the equality has the measure of a price. Therefore, expected rents 
are completely passed through on prices, and all the differences in expected rates 
with respect to the first best are determined by the high cost firm’s allocation. 
The supervision technology.–– Let me now introduce two supervisors (a regulator 
and a judge) who, exerting costly effort, produce two independent signals that are 
observed by the planner. The signals’ precision is  l ξ  with  { } , lR J = . If θ θ = , with 
probability  l ξ  the planner sees  θ  and implements the full information contract 
and with probability 1 l ξ −  she observes φ. If, instead, θ θ = , then she always 
observes  φ. The planner assures a reservation utility r to the two supervisors, 
who always participate in the game and are not allowed to side contract with each 
other. The regulator moves first. If the planner remains uninformed, the judge   11
generates an orthogonal signal with the same structure.
12 Supervisors are 
evaluated on the observable but not contractible  l ξ , whose technology is 
multiplicative in the random (common) ability  [ ] 0,1 α∈  and in the unobservable 
effort  [ ] 0,1 l e ∈ : that is,  ll e ξ α = .
13 
The parameter α  is drawn from a distribution with mean α , variance 
2
α σ  and 
density  f  independent of  l e . In order to narrow down the possible cases, I shall 
concentrate on the class of the canonical, non degenerate, continuous distributions 
supported on a bounded interval and with hump-shaped density: that is, Beta, 
generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, inverted U-quadratic, and truncated 
normal (see Johnson et al., 1994). Moreover, I shall assume that: 
A1: When  f  is truncated normal  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 2 αα α σ ασ α σ π ⎡⎤ Φ− − Φ − < ⎣⎦ , where 
Φ  is the standard normal cumulative function. 
The assumption assures that, for all the distribution in the class, the density  f  is 
not too flat at the mean, and, in particular, that  ( ) 1 f α > . As a result, the marginal 
probability of drawing a supervisor with less than average talent is not too low. In 
the most sensible case, in which there are no extreme types and  ( ) ( ) 01 0 ff == ––
Beta, generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, and inverted U-quadratic––the 
                                                 
12 This set-up captures, in the case of the US electricity market, on one side, the nature of the 
evidence processing (which is de facto devolved upon the staff), and, on the other, the nature of 
judicial reviews (new hearings leading to de novo decisions). 
13 The effort has to be correctly considered as net of all the activities intended to hide valuable 
information. A multiplicative technology avoids the tiresome qualifications that an additive one 
needs: the choice, however, is immaterial. If the performance is any continuous and increasing 
function of the precision (e.g., expected social welfare), all the results remain unaffected.    12
requirement is always met (proofs available from the author).
14 When, instead, 
this is not the case (truncated normal) the regularity on the measure of completely 
skilled and unskilled types, contained in A1, is required. Overall, this last 
assumption has to be considered as an essentially mild one given the high 
complexity and the fast changing nature of the regulation task.  
Supervisors’ objective functions.–– As suggested by Maskin and Tirole (2004), I 
suppose that supervisors respond to both implicit incentives and intrinsic 
motivations: they not only value being in office for its own sake but also wish to 
leave a legacy. In other words, not only being reappointed or re-elected brings 
valuable perquisites or satisfies tastes for influence (implicit incentives), but 
supervisors want to be remembered for great things they have accomplished for 
society at large, or of a part of it (intrinsic motivations). Therefore, I posit that a 
supervisor’s utility depends on both her identity and the degree of accountability 
to which she is subjected. Therefore, a generic supervisor’s interim (relative to the 
moment in which she exerts effort) utility function writes as 
( ) () ( ) () ( )() ( ) { } ,, , , ,1 1 1 1 1
i
il il il il ReS S R G e S J K C e r ⎡⎤ =+ − −−− − ⎣⎦ ,                              ( ) 5  
where  { } , iA E =  indexes the appointment rule to which she is subjected.  () 0,1 K∈  
is an efficiency of the information gathering technology parameter, and the effort 
cost function is such that  ( ) 00 C = ,  0 C′ > ,  ( ) 0 C′ < ∞,  ( )
, 1, lim
il ei l Ce → ′ =∞,  0 C′′ > . 
The term in square brackets represents the non-monetary bonus obtained over and 
above  r. In addition, the shape of the implicit reward function 
i G  differentiates 
appointed from elected officials and S  distinguishes regulators from judges (in 
                                                 
14 Some non-continuous distributions in the same class (for example, triangular) have the same 
property. To be hump-shaped, the Beta and Kumaraswamy need to have parameters greater than 1.    13
particular, it is equal to 1 for a regulator and 0 for a judge). In order to grasp a 
deeper understanding of nonmonetary incentives, I shall leave aside signalling 
and money-burning incentives and, consequently, assume that supervisors select 
effort before knowing their random ability. Then, nature chooses α . Next, the 
outcomes are observed and the nonmonetary rewards inclusive utility paid.  
For what concerns implicit incentives, I embrace the distinction between 
politicians and bureaucrats proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2007): while 
elected officials are held accountable by voters, at election time, those appointed 
are accountable to their professional peers or to society for the way they fulfill the 
goals of their organization. In particular, appointed officials want to maximize the 
conditional perception of their ability. Therefore, if  [ ] E ⋅  denotes the supervisor’s 
unconditional expectation over  , Al ξ ,  E the evaluator’s expectation over α 
conditional on  , Al ξ  and the (correct in equilibrium) evaluator’s expectation over 
effort 
exp




Al Al Al Ge E e αξ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
. Turning to voters, they realize that the 
alternative to the incumbent is an average talented official exerting effort  exp
, E l e ; so, 
the incumbent is re-elected if the realized performance is greater than  exp
,, E lE l e ξα = %  or 
() { } { }
exp
,, , , , Pr Pr
E
El El El El El Ge e e ξξ α α ⎡ ⎤ =≥ = ≥ ⎣ ⎦
% . Both the market value of talent and office 
holding are normalized to 1.  
Turning to intrinsic motivations,  ( ) 0,1 J ∈  and  ( ) 0,1 R∈  measure the “fairness” and 
the “revolving-door” motivations. Political and legal scholars have assumed that 
judges try to make the (ex post) correct decision in order to signal their fairness 
and commitment. For instance, Miceli and Coşgel (1994) envision that judges 
suffer a utility loss when overturned and gain utility when cited. The disclosure of   14
the firm’s information, instead, is less appealing for officials attracted by future 
job opportunities in the industry. As Quirk (1981) shows, more pro-industry US 
federal regulators anticipate enhanced chances of working for the regulated firm 
(see also Gormley, 1983). So I assume that the judges’ cost of effort (regulators’ 
implicit rewards) decreases with J  (R). Finally, notice that the revolving-door 
effect does not seem to exist for judges. 
The timing.–– The timing of the game is as follows: 
1. Society (that is, planner, supervisors and the firm) learns the nature of the 
regulatory environment (P,  { } , θ θθ ∈ ). Next, the firm discovers the value of θ. 
2. The planner offers the firm a menu of ( ) , tq pairs. If it declines, the game ends. 
3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; then she discovers the value of α . 
Next, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative, the first best is 
implemented. If the planner remains uninformed, the judge moves. 
4. Step 3 is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the firm reports 
its information to the planner. 
5. A reward-quantity pair is implemented. Finally, the signals’ precisions are 
revealed and each supervisor is rewarded. 
Implicit incentives build into the model a division of power structure: officials 
care about their evaluators’ moves but not about the pricing rule selected by the 
planner. This has three consequences. First, implicit incentives reduce the scope 
for side-contracts between the firm and the supervisors, because the former has to 
reimburse nonmonetary rewards to the latter. Second, if the firm’s informational 
rent is not only a loss, as it is in equation ( ) 3 , supervisors’ and planner’s goals can 
collide. Third, the basic equilibrium can easily be obtained by looking separately   15
at the supervisors’ effort choice and at the planner’s pricing rule selection. Before 
looking in the detail at the first two points, I shall illustrate the last one. 
 
3.2 Implicit Incentives, Intrinsic Motivations and Equilibrium Prices 
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The latter is characterized 
by a tuple of equilibrium efforts (one for each possible supervisor’s type) and a 
menu of ( ) , tq  pairs contingent on the signals’ realizations. Proceeding by 
backward induction, the solution to the supervisors’ problem implies that: 
LEMMA 1: Label the regulators’ (judges’) selection rule with i (j). Each 
supervisor’s problem has a unique and interior solution. In addition, equilibrium 
efforts 
, ˆij e  are such that, for all  f  in the class considered: (1) 
, ˆ 0 iR eR i ∂ ∂<∀  , 
, ˆ 0, jJ eJ j ∂∂ > ∀  , 
, ˆ 0, il eK i l ∂∂ > ∀  and 
, ˆ 0, jl eK j l ∂ ∂> ∀; (2) under A1, 
,, ˆˆ , El Al eel >∀ . 
Point 1 underscores not only the role of a more efficient information-gathering 
technology but also the effects of opposite legacy goals: the effort exerted by 
supervisors striving to please the industry (to be ex-post correct) tends to decrease 
(increase) as the congruency with original tasks fades away. Even more crucially, 
point 2 states that, when it is not too easy to substitute an incumbent supervisor 
with a mean-ability one (i.e., if A1 holds), an elected supervisor panders to voters 
exerting more effort than would an appointed one. Despite the different set up, the 
result is driven by incentives similar to the pandering ones identified by Maskin 
and Tirole (2004). Lemma 1 also confirms, under the more realistic asymmetric 
information assumption, the results obtained by Besley and Coate (2003).
15  
                                                 
15 I can easily introduce a bundling incentive here, assuming that appointed regulators have an R 
greater than the one of elected regulators. This would only reinforce Point 2. Focusing on   16
At Stage 2 the planner offers the firm a menu of transfers-quantity pairs fully 
characterized by the supervisors’ expected efforts. Let  ( ) () ,, , ˆˆ ˆ 1, iR iR jJ ee e i j αα α γ +− ≡ , 
the planner’s posterior belief on θ θ =  conditional on two uninformative signals is 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr , 1 , 1 , vi j v i j θθ φ φ γ γ ⎡⎤ == − − ⎣⎦ , 







s SS S vi j
Wv i j W v i j V q q q
vi j
γ
γγ λ θ λ θ
γ
⎧ ⎡⎤ − ⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ − − + − Δ + ⎨ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ − ⎪ ⎩
%       










⎫ − ⎪ ⎡⎤ +− + − + ⎬ ⎣⎦ − ⎪ ⎭
,                       
where  * W   is the first-best welfare obtained when at least one signal is 
informative. The planner evaluates supervisors’ monetary perks at the shadow 
cost of public funds 1 μ +  and, without loss of generality, does not value implicit 
incentives. All the novelties in the optimum problem, which has a unique and 
positive solution, are contained in the expected ex post probability of at least an 
informative signal  () , ij γ . The equilibrium high cost firm’s allocation is given by:  
() () () ( ) ˆ 11 ,
S Vq v i j λ θλ γ θ ′ ⎡⎤ =+ + Γ − Δ ⎣⎦ .                                                                  () 6  
Clearly, the hierarchical hearings structure is useful and the allocative distortion is 
partially curbed with respect equation ( ) 4  (i.e., 
* ˆˆ S qq q < < ). In particular, given 
that  () , ij γ  does increase with both 
, ˆiR e  and  , ˆjJ e , the following holds true:   
PROPOSITION 1: Regulated prices are decreasing with the efficiency of the 
                                                                                                                                     
normally distributed talent observable with noise, Alesina and Tabellini (2007) show that a 
sufficiently high uncertainty over talent implies patterns opposite to those in Point 2. This is not 
realistic in the present instance: dockets are widely publicized (so that talent is observed without 
noise) and supervisors’ curricula vitae are consistent one with the other (small ability dispersion).   17
information-gathering technology K, greater (lower) the stronger regulators’ 
(judges’) implicit motivations are and (under A1) lower if supervisors are elected. 
When the expected probability of informative signals rises, the planner optimally 
relaxes the allocative distortion, and this, in turn, implies lower expected rates. So 
complementarities between supervisors’ implicit and the firm’s explicit incentives 
endogenously arise from the contractibility of the firm’s allocation, as opposed to 
the noncontractibility of the supervisors’ performance (see also Guerriero, 2008). 
Fairness motivations fuel the pattern while revolving-door concerns limit it.  
Remark.–– Suppose that, between Stages 1 and 5, an input costs shock hits high 
and low average costs so that their ex ante expected difference becomes () 1 η θ +Δ . 
Then, Proposition 1 describes, in the same qualitatively way, the determinants of 
the pass-through of cost-shocks η  into prices  ( ) ( )( ) ˆ 1,
S Vq v i j η λγ θ ′ ⎡ ⎤ ∂ ∂=Γ − Δ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
3.3 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribery 
The appeal of this result lies not only in the sensibility of the model’s premises 
which bridge nonmonetary incentives to the asymmetry in technological information 
but also in the realism of their consequences. Studying a similar environment, the 
new regulatory economics (Laffont and Martimort, 1999; Laffont, 2000) obtains 
collusion-proof equilibria in which monetary perks equal to the firm’s expected 
stake are given to explicitly interested supervisors to avoid corruption. The pattern 
matches a consistent evidence on regulatory reforms which has clarified the 
narrow role of capture (see Gormley, 1983; Teske et al., 2004, ch. 4) but it is 
completely at odds with any observed regulatory contracts. On the contrary, the 
above equilibrium not only has similar collusion proofness properties, but also   18
builds on the observed residual rights nature of supervisors’ activities.
16 To clarify 
the point, I consider the lobbying game proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2008) 
and based on the observation that supervisors exert effort in other tasks.  
The firms’ lobby tries to divert supervisors’ effort from information-gathering to 
the fulfillment of a second task (e.g., to avoid by-passing by non-regulated firms) 
whose technology is 
,,
h
il il he α = , and whose benefits are negligible for consumers 
and 
, il h κ  ( 0 κ > ) for the firm. As in Alesina and Tabellini (2008), the planner does 
not foresee equilibrium capture and cannot condition his choice––i.e., the rule 
giving price as a function of average costs––on collusive activities. α is truncated 
normally distributed, and the effort cost function is additive in the effort devoted 
to the two tasks. Also, the lobby, whose vote is irrelevant, has all the bargaining 
power and, in Stage 2, can commit to bribes 
, il b  and/or campaign funds 
, E l n  (to 
elected supervisors only) to be paid after Stage5. These influence instruments are 
contracts contingent on effort, but bribes are illegal. If a supervisor accepts them 
with probability  0 υ >  she is caught and pays a fine  0 M > . If  0 τ >  measures the 
value of implicit rewards relative to illegal bribes, supervisors’ utility  rewrites as 
() ()() ( )() ( ) { } ,,, ,, , , , (,, ) 1 1 , 11 1
CCh iCh C h
il il il il il il il il ReeS S R Gee S J K C e e rb M τ υ ⎡⎤ =+ − −−− − + + − ⎣⎦ , 
where the index C stands for capture. Implicit rewards are the same as before if 
appointment is used, but differ if election is employed. Campaign funds lower 
voters’ reservation utility to  ( )
exp
,, E lE l eH n α −  with  ( ) 00 H = , 0 H′ > ,  0 H′′ < . The lobby’s 
indirect utility is  () ( ) ( ) ( )
,
,, ,, , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 1,
Cs C h h




hats indicating equilibrium values. The subgame equilibrium of the menu auction 
                                                 
16 Over the period 1980-1997, for instance, IOUs’ average revenues from retail sales were 1.94 
billion dollars while commissioners’ average salaries were 59,774 dollars.   19
bribing game and of the lobbying game are jointly optimal for the lobby and the 
supervisor, given the evaluators’ expectations. Tedious algebra (proofs available 
from the author) shows that, for τ  sufficiently large, appointed supervisors never 
accept bribes, and that the lobby prefers to be ex-ante passive rather than pay 
bribes if the
 
firm’s stake is too narrow or legal systems work efficiently, that is 
M υ  is large. Strong (weak) fairness (revolving door) motivations favor capture-
free equilibria. Also, full-capture equilibria with positive campaign funds are 
never optimal because supervisors always lose elections, and the lobby is not 
willing to offer campaign aids if money is not very effective in swaying votes, 
i.e.,  H′ is small. So strong implicit incentives and/or an inefficient corruption 
technology make the equilibrium in Proposition 1 endogenously collusion-proof. 
 
4. Endogenous Regulatory Institutions 
So far, the analysis suggests that election should be used whenever the selected 
performance is sufficiently informative about supervisors’ random ability. The 
picture, however, is incomplete, because the model completely abstracts from the 
consequences that selection rules have on the firm’s investment incentives. From 
this (dynamic efficiency) point of view, the role of appointment rules is twofold. 
On one hand, as the next section shows, the firm’s ex post rents and so its 
incentives to invest rise with supervisors’ efforts and so with election. On the other 
hand, however, ex post rents also worsen the burden of those performance-based 
aids implemented by governments to encourage investment ex post.
17 In this 
                                                 
17 These are, for instance, all those incentive regulations “designed to encourage [...] certain 
investments (e.g., network modernization or energy efficiency [...])” (Basheda et al., 2001).   20
perspective, regulatory reforms should balance the eventual dynamic inefficiency 
in investment with the distortions driven by the funding of aids. Moreover, this 
efficiency trade-off creates also political incentives. Indeed, ex post rents arise a 
conflict among consumers, if only some of them own the firm’s shares. This, in 
turn, makes regulatory reforms inefficiently sensitive to political competition if 
ratepayer and shareholder groups have political power. 
In the next section I consider the two elements together, assuming that institutions 
are designed, between Stages 1 and 2 (just before the planner chooses the pricing 
rule), by one of two political parties––the pro-shareholder R or the pro-consumer 
D. Each party faces electoral uncertainty and can favor its constituency directly 
through investment aids and indirectly through regulatory regime reforms.  
 
4.1 Efficiency-Driven and Strategic Appointment Rules Reforms 
The analysis applies to both types of public officials. Nevertheless, being judges 
responsible for several non-regulatory tasks (e.g., anti-discrimination charges), 
the main focus will be on the method of selecting regulators. For simplicity, I also 
assume that the planner cannot commit to reimburse investment costs.
18 
The investment game set up.–– The appointment rule is selected by the incumbent 
party m.  After Stage 2, but before the firm eventually commits to the investment, 
an election with exogenous winning probabilities  m x  is held and the winner 
selects the size of an investment aid. The aid assumes the form of a subsidy 
financed from distortionary taxes, equal to a fixed portion  1 m ρ −  of the invested 
                                                 
18 Even if the used and useful doctrine partially assures against non commitment, the hypothesis is 
the more appropriate in mature markets (such as electricity) where retaliation by the firm could not 
be very damaging (Newbery, 2000, ch. 2). Under commitment, the main results continue to hold.   21
capital and paid to the firm after the investment is implemented. The investment 
requires a fixed monetary cost  0 I ≥  and has a stochastic return with expected 
value  () 10 ππ δπ δ ≡+ −>  with  0 π π >>,  0 δ > . The firm is infinitively risk 
averse in the range of the ex-post negative utilities. So, in the investment regime 




m qI θρ π Δ +≥  where 
ˆ , mD R =  indexes the winning party. The latter is the case even if perfect financial 




m Iq πθρ − >Δ − . 
The reformer’s utility.–– Each party attaches to the ex-post participation (to the 
investment game) constraint the weight  0 ο >  and evaluates the expected aid at 
the shadow price of public funds. The static versus dynamic efficiency trade-off is 
summarized by Λ, and investment and taxation distortions concerns are balanced 
by the party specific parameters  m χ  and  m υ . While  m υ  picks up the party’s 
aversion to impose higher taxes,  m χ   captures the party’s willingness to leave 
higher ex post rents to the shareholders constituency.  
All in all, the incumbent m % ’s indirect utility writes as a function of 
, ˆiR e  only as 
() () ( ) () () () () ()
, ,
,, , ,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 11 1
SI SI
iR m m iR iR m iR We vx x e We v e οχ μ υ Λ+ − Λ − − + Ψ = Λ+ − Λ Ω Ψ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ %% % %% % , 
where the first term on the left is the expected ex post expected welfare,  x = %  
D DR R x x ρ ρ + ,  ( ) ( ) ˆ 11 D DR R x xx ρρ =− +−,  ( ) ()
,
, ˆ ˆ 1,
SI
iR ei j q γθ Ψ≡ − Δ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .  
Finally, I shall impose the following restrictions on the exogenous parameters:
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;  Λ<Λ. 
Interpretation.––  In interpreting the foregoing, several observations should be   22
borne in mind. First, the analysis applies unchanged if the aid is not nonmonetary 
and μ  is replaced by λ, or, generally, by a shadow price of the incumbent party’s 
effort. Second, the fact that the winning party cannot reform the appointment rule 
captures lags and the commitment periods typical of regulation.
19 
Third, the assumption (A2.a) that the pro-shareholder party selects a higher level 
of aid and cares more about distortionary taxation and investment inducement is 
in the spirit of those models of electoral competition in which candidates commit 
to well-defined policies well ahead of elections and then stick to them (see 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 3). To this extent, the last inequality in Point 1 of 
A2 simply requires that the platforms of the two parties are sufficiently distant. 
Fourth, the idea that distortionary taxation is per se more relevant than investment 
inducement (first inequality A2.b) captures, in reduced form, the bundling effect 
advocated by Besley and Coate (2003) and it is a mild restriction to impose when 
other more salient policies are part of  the political platform.  
Finally, the last two inequalities in A2.b are extremely natural requirements in the 
present set up and they simply ask that the inverse demand is inelastic (which is 
the empirically relevant case for a regulated good which is usually a necessity),
20 
and that for each party, despite its ideological motivations, dynamic efficiency 
concerns are sufficiently relevant with respect to static efficiency ones. 
Equilibrium.––  The incumbent  m %   prefers election to appointment if: 
() () () () ()() ,, , ,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 11
SS
ER AR m m AR ER We We vx x e e οχ μ γ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ Λ−> − Λ − − + Ψ − Ψ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
%% %% % .                       ( ) 7  
                                                 
19 According to NARUC data, over the period 1974-1990 the mean duration of electricity hearings 
has been 9 months (see also Friedman, 1991). Moreover, when a regulatory docket is closed, the 
resulting contract typically specifies a commitment period of five years (Basheda et al., 2001). 
20 Notice, that the opposite always holds true for quadratic and CES (CRRA) utilities.   23
Applying the envelope theorem to both sides of the inequality, it is easy to see 
that, as discussed above, the effect of a change in one of the exogenous 
parameters  R,  K ,  D x , 
R x  on the likelihood of a reform toward election is twofold. 
The first effect is driven by static efficiency worries and it goes through the 
derivative with respect to 
, ˆiR e  of the left-hand side. The second effect is related to 
dynamic efficiency concerns, and goes through the derivative with respect to 
, ˆiR e  
of the right-hand side. While the first effect is clearly positive, the sign of second 
is ambiguous. Indeed, Ψ is composed by two terms: the expected probability of 
two uninformative signals and the ex-post rent. While the latter increases with 
, ˆiR e  
because more information calls for less allocative distortions, the former falls 
with the probability of a first informative signal, and so with 
, ˆiR e . Yet, as the 
Appendix shows, 
, ˆiR e ∂Ψ ∂  is unambiguously determined if 
, 1 pq ε ≤ − .  
The following Lemma summarizes the relation among Ψ, R and K :
21 
LEMMA 2: If 
, 1 pq ε ≤−  then 
, ˆ 0 iR e ∂Ψ∂ >  and, under A1,  ( ) ( ) ,, ˆˆ E RA R ee Ψ> Ψ,  ( ) , ˆER eR ∂Ψ ∂ − 
( ) , ˆ 0 AR eR ∂Ψ ∂ <  
and  ( ) ( ) ,, ˆˆ 0 ER AR eK eK ∂Ψ ∂ −∂Ψ ∂ > . 
Lemma 2 brings two main consequences. First, a change in each of the exogenous 
parameters has impacts different in sign on the static and dynamic efficiency parts 
of the reformer’s utility. Nevertheless, if reformers are sufficiently investment 
concerned (that is, if Λ<Λ), it can be shown (see the Appendix) that the total 
effect is unambiguous, and dynamic efficiency prevails on static one. Second, the 
finding that 
, ˆ 0 iR e ∂Ψ ∂ > , along with the fact that 
m Ω %  is always negative under A2, 
                                                 
21 Notice the complementarity (substitutability) among the efficiency of the information-gathering 
technology (revolving-door motivations) and implicit incentives in enhancing  efforts.   24
assures that both parties have an incentive to select appointment, provided that Λ 
is not too big or Λ<Λ. The last inequality in A2 ensures that Λ <Λ; therefore, 
the determinants of selection rules reforms are completely identified as follows:  
PROPOSITION 2: Provided that A1 and A2 hold and 
, 1 pq ε ≤ − , a Λ does exists, 
with Λ<Λ<Λ: such that forΛ <Λ (Λ <Λ<Λ) appointment (election) is always 
preferred, and for Λ<Λ<Λ either one or the other can be chosen. In the last 
case, the incumbent’s preferences toward election (A) rise with Λ, are stronger 
(weaker), the stronger are revolving-door motivations (is the efficiency of the 
information-gathering technology and (B) the incumbent’s hold on power). The 
incumbent’s identity has an ambiguous effect on her preferences toward election. 
Proposition 2 (whose proof is reported in the Appendix) stresses the existence of 
two determinants of selection rules: a trade-off between dynamic inconsistency 
and distortionary taxation (A) and a strategic incentive to tie the rival party’s 
hands, coming from election uncertainty (B). The former survives if politics is 
completely shut down and implies a clear-cut normative result: a reformer 
worried by dynamic efficiency should opt for election if technological and 
institutional characteristics render ineffective pandering incentives.  
For what concerns the second incentive, a considerable body of political economy 
literature (see, for example, Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Hanssen, 2004a) claims 
that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to implement 
institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to limit the actions 
of future incumbents: selection rule reforms are a case in point. In particular, an 
increase in the probability of being elected and consequently fixing a higher 
(lower) investment aid fosters party R’s (D’s) incentives to select appointment in   25
order to curb the distortions deriving from taxation (being investment concerns 
lower, in a stochastic sense).  
Remark.–– If implicit rewards are  ( ) 1
E A GG ϒ+ − ϒ , Proposition 2 can be intended as 
stating the reformer’s preferences over the power ϒ––in terms of pandering 
enhancing incentives––of different selection rules.  
If A1 and A2 hold and with P and θ  held constant, Propositions 1 and 2, along 
with their related remarks, can be restated as testable predictions, as follows: 
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS: The likelihood of a reform toward more powerful 
pandering institutions will (1) increase with the strength of revolving-door 
motivations, (2) falls with the efficiency of the information-gathering technology 
and with society’s investment concerns, and (3) be greater, the weaker is the 
incumbent hold on power. The effect of the reformer’s identity is ambiguous. (4) 
Both prices and the pass-through of cost shocks will decrease with the efficiency 
of the information-gathering technology, rise (fall) the stronger are regulators’ 
(judges’) implicit motivations, and be lower if supervisors are elected. 
Next, I look first at the determinants of regulatory selection procedures and then 
examine the endogenous impact of supervisors’ implicit incentives on prices.  
 
5.  Evidence 
To evaluate the model’s predictions, I require, first of all, a comparable sample of 
institutions that vary in their effect on supervisors’ pandering incentives. To this 
extent, I consider the procedure of selecting public utility commissioners and 
High Court judges, and I rank each rule in terms of pandering incentives. There 
are seven methods of selecting commissioners: direct election, appointment by   26
Governor, gubernatorial appointment with approval by the Senate or the executive 
council,
22 gubernatorial appointment with approval by Legislature, and selection 
by Legislature/General Assembly. There are five judicial selection rules: partisan 
and nonpartisan election, appointment by Governor or Legislature, and merit plan.  
Ranking pandering incentives.–– It is widely accepted that partisan elections turns 
public officials into politicians: “candidates are chosen in party primaries make 
campaign speeches, seek political contributions (parties are a major source of 
campaign funds), and so forth” (Hanssen, 2004a). An equally strong consensus 
holds that the most independent judges are those subject to the merit plan, which 
avoids competitive elections or appointment but mandates unopposed retention 
elections (Hanssen, 2004a).
23 By the same token, regulators selected through the 
consensus of both houses can be considered the most insulated from political 
competition, as they are not directly attached to the party of the Governor. The 
other procedures are less easily ranked in terms of pandering incentives.  
Thus I posit that the value of the following two ordered indicators increases with 
the power (in terms of pandering incentives) of regulatory and judicial selection 
rules: Reg_Ord equal to one if commissioners are selected with the approval of 
both state houses (i.e., with one of the last three rules listed above), three if direct 
election is employed and two otherwise; Jud_Ord indicator equal to one if the 
merit plan is used, three if the state uses partisan elections, and two otherwise. In 
order to evaluate the relation between pandering incentives and prices, I shall use, 
                                                 
22 This is a state house in New Hampshire, and a board selected by the majority party in Ohio. 
23 Non-partisan judicial election forbids candidates to reveal their party affiliation. Besley and 
Payne (2005) claim that the merit plan is the more accountability enhancing rule because of the 
retention procedure, yet, sitting judges almost never lose these elections (see Hanssen, 2004a).    27
instead, the binaries Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec which equal one if direct election is 
employed and 0 otherwise.
24 The analysis considers a panel of forty-nine states 
for the period 1970-1997.
25 During the sample, some states altered their rules (see 
Table 1): this provides time-series and cross-sectional variation to exploit. 
 
5.1 Non Random Appointment Rules Selection 
In order to fully exploit the three-dimensional variation (over time, across states and 
across power levels) in pandering enhancing institutions, I estimate two models. Both 
models aim at explaining the probability of reforms toward more powerful rules.
 26 
Empirical strategy.–– The first model is the following multinomial logit 
( ) ( ) ()
3
,, 1 Pr exp exp it it i t k i t k k yk z z z ββ
= ′′ == ∑ % % ,  
where the dependent 
it y  is Reg_Ord.
27 The second model is the ordered logit: 
, it yk =  if  *
1, ki t k y τ τ − ≤<  for  *
, i t it it yz β ε ′ = +  and  1, 2 k = ,  
where  k τ  are unknown parameters and  it y  is either Reg_Ord or Jud_Ord. In both 
models,  it z  gathers the eventually time-varying proxies for supervisors’ intrinsic 
motivations, the efficiency of the information-gathering technology, society’s 
                                                 
24 South Carolina and Tennessee changed their rules in 1996. I consider both to be electing given 
that Tennessee retained its commissioners. My results do not change if I use a different definition. 
25 Because of a lack of data, Nebraska and the District of Columbia are not considered. For the 
same reason, the period 1960-1969 (included in Besley and Coate, 2003) is not considered. Yet 
unbalanced panels deliver similar results. The same is true when the switching states are left out. 
26 The strategy embraced is also driven by the lack of within variation in many controls. Yet the 
coefficients of the time-varying covariates are qualitatively similar if a fixed effects logit is run. 
27 In order to save space, the multinomial logit with dependent Jud_Ord is not reported. Its results 
are qualitatively similar to those of the ordered logit with dependent Jud_Ord.   28
investment concerns and political competition.
28 Next, I introduce these proxies, 
relating each to the prediction to which it refers.  
Measuring the structural determinants of selection rules.–– Let me start from the 
first prediction. Following Teske (2004, ch.4), I use a dummy variable equal to 
one if there are restrictions on how long a commissioner must wait, after service, 
before taking a job in the industry (Rev_Door). Rev_Door can proxy for weaker 
or stronger pro-industry motivations depending on whether the loss of 
attractiveness of future job opportunities dominates the incentive to implement 
more biased and everlasting decisions to signal a revolving door interest or the 
opposite is true.
29 I also consider whether commissioners can not be of the same 
party (Bipartisan).  Such a bipartisanship requirement should counterbalance the 
Besley and Coate’s (2003) bindling effect leading to less pro-shareholder appointed 
regulators. Thus, the prior is that Bipartisan is negatively linked to the likelihood of a 
reform toward more powerful pandering incentives. For what concerns judicial 
selection, a wide literature on judicial independence (see Hanssen, 2004a) claims 
that a longer term of office increases the judges’ insulation, diluting, in turn, their 
reputational concerns. Accordingly, I consider the length of the judicial term 
(Jud_Term) as a measure for less powerful legacy motivations (see Leaver, 2004). 
Focusing on the second prediction, it is reasonable to assume that more abundant 
resources and more powerful consumer groups ease information-gathering. The 
                                                 
28 Lemma 2 does not exclude a role for interacted regressors. If I introduce the latter in a logit 
model with dependent Reg_Elec, they are usually not significant at a probability of the reform 
level of 0 or 0.5 (the drawbacks linked to this specification are discussed in Ai and Norton, 2003). 
29 Similar crowding effects have been widely documented in environments where implicit and 
intrinsic motivations interact: Bénabou and Tirole (2006) provide a first full-fledged theory. I 
thank David Ulph for drawing my attention to this particular point.   29
proxies I use are: the total budget (in thousands of dollars) available to the PUC’s 
staff (Budget) and the share of revenues from sales to industrial users (Industrial). 
Turning to society’s investment concerns, I assume that a more costly generation 
increases society’s interest in more efficient cost-reducing technologies. Thus, I 
include the share of generation from hydroelectric sources (Gen_Hydro) and a 
dummy variable equal to one if Reg_Elec has been reformed in state i during the 
oil crisis period (Oil_Ref): that is, 1973-1982. The former (latter) should correlate 
negatively (positively) with society’s investment concerns.  
To test the third prediction, I need a measure of political competition. Embracing 
the strategy proposed by Hanssen (2004a), I employ the share of seats held by the 
majority party averaged across upper and lower houses (Majority) as a proxy for a 
stronger incumbent’s hold on power. I also need a proxy for the incumbent’s 
constituency ideology. Several researchers (see Teske, 2004, ch. 4) hold that the 
Republican Party historically has been more pro-shareholder: I therefore consider 
also whether both houses were under the Republicans’ control (Rep).  
Scholars of policy innovation claim that the diffusion of a new policy displays 
social learning (see Teske, 2004, ch. 4): after a state has adopted a new institution, 
surrounding states are more likely to follow suit. So I introduce the share of 
surrounding states electing their regulators (Ereg_Nei) or their judges (Ejud_Nei).  
Yet, US states also differ in other dimensions: namely, their tastes for election and 
the age of their institutions. While the relevance of the former is self-explanatory, 
the latter is of empirical importance because mature PUCs and governments 
might have devised formal and informal rules of conduct easing information-
gathering in a way that is not captured by Budget or Industrial. These dimensions 
are unobservable, and so I use as proxies the year the PUC was founded   30
(PUC_Fou), the year the state joined the Union (Join), and whether state auditors 
are elected (Aud_Elec). Two rule-specific determinants are: whether the PUC was 
constitutionally formed (PUC_Con) which proxies for the saliency of regulation, 
and whether Jud_Elec is changed in the twentieth century (20th_Jref ) which 
proxies for the development of new judicial appointment rules (see Hanssen, 
2004a). I also control for federal policies using the share of generation from 
nuclear sources (Gen_Nucl). Variables descriptions, means and standard errors 
are listed in Table 2. The Appendix reports variables sources and construction. 
Results: regulatory institutions.–– The first panel of Table 3 reports the estimated 
marginal effects of the multinomial logit with dependent variable Reg_Ord. For 
the most part, the results are consistent with the model’s predictions, and the 
implied effects are large. A reform toward the bipartisanship requirement for 
appointed regulators reduces the likelihood of direct election by a little more than 
18 percent and raises the likelihood of appointment with approval by both houses 
by 2 percent. A one-percentage-point increase in the size of the majority is 
associated with a 0.021 percentage-point-increase in the likelihood of reforms 
toward appointment with approval by both houses. 
Focusing on the first two predictions, more abundant resources and those factors 
fostering society’s investment concerns lower the likelihood of more powerful 
pandering institutions. Only the behaviour of Industrial is unexpected and could 
be driven by the fact that watchdog groups’ special interests are limiting in spite 
of ameliorating the quality of the information-gathering process.  
Turning to the third prediction, less powered institutions are found where the 
political competition is tighter and Republican parties seem to dislike direct 
election even if the coefficient attached to Rep is not statistically significant. The   31
data also confirm the supposed learning process, and a one-standard-deviation 
increase (0.271) in Ereg_Nei increases the likelihood of direct elections by a little 
more than 11 percent. Additionally, more mature institutions and a basic taste for 
election tend to decrease the likelihood of lower-powered institutions and higher 
values of Gen_Nucl push toward higher powered pandering institutions. The 
ordered logit estimates (listed in column 2) deliver similar results. This time, the 
proxies for the efficiency determinants are more powerful than those for the 
strategic dynamics in explaining the reforms toward higher powered institutions.
30 
Results: judicial institutions.–– Column 3 lists the estimates of the ordered logit 
model with dependent Reg_Ord. As Hanssen (2004a) shows, using an argument 
similar to the one devised in Section 4, that the merit plan (partisan election) is 
linked to a tighter (less tight) political competition and longer terms curb this 
pattern. Column 3 confirms this prediction. Also, even if the effect of a more 
efficient information-gathering technology is unexpected, the ordered log-odds of 
adopting more powerful rules increase with society’s investment concerns.  
 
5.2 Regulated Prices and Supervisors’ Implicit Incentives 
All in all, the distribution of regulatory institutions across American states reflects 
both efficiency and forward-looking concerns. This non random assignment of 
reforms not only confirms the model’s ideas but also implies that the effect of 
implicit incentives on regulatory policies can be assessed correctly only when 
                                                 
30 The results remain very similar if a dummy for state consumer advocate office, the number of 
PUC employees and commissioners, the commissioners’ salary and term of office, state income 
per capita, population, proportion of young and old citizens, and regional dummies are introduced. 
Clustering the standard errors does not affect the analysis significantly.   32
these institutions are treated as endogenous. Indeed, states may self-select into 
election on the bases of unobserved political and technological shocks fostering 
investment concerns, as well as of a basic strain in making acceptable the need for 
investment to electricity users.  
If the variation in selection rules used to explain prices is related to these 
unexplained determinants of policies, the OLS estimator becomes biased. 
Empirical methodology.–– I conduct two tests: 1. I employ the fixed time and 
state effects OLS estimator in order to “minimize concerns about the correlation 
between the regulatory regime and other sources of long-run heterogeneity among 
the states that drive the selection of the regulatory regime” (Besley and Coate, 
2003); and 2. I fully endogenize the effect of supervisors’ implicit incentives 
employing a difference GMM estimator. The basic specification is: 
,1 , 2 , , 3 , , , , __
s
it i t it it it it it it it y c R e g E l e cc J u d E l e cc X η ϑφ φ φ ϕ ε =++ + + + +.                       
,
s
it y  is a price in state i and year t defined in terms of revenue per electricity sales 
(cents per Kwh) for customer class s . The classes considered are: residential 
(Price_R), commercial (Price_C) and industrial (Price_I).  i η  are state-fixed 
effects which proxy for time-invariant features of the regulated environment such 
as state laws and long-run differences in states’ production systems.  t ϑ  are year 
dummies that pick up macro-shocks, industry-wide technological advances and 
changes in federal policies.  , it c  is a fossil fuel costs index devised by Besley and 
Coate (2003).  , it X  is a vector of time-varying controls. It gathers the time-varying 
determinants of selection rules, state population (Pop), shares of population aged 
between five and seventeen (Young) and sixty-five and over (Old), and income 
per capita (GSP). Other controls are Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec, population squared and   33
income per capita squared. These covariates either lack within variation 
(Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec) or, if differenced, are collinear with the other covariates 
(Pop
2 and GSP
2): thus, they are not considered in the GMM specification.
31 
Finally, another crucial explanatory variable is the dependent variable lagged one 
period. Hearing lags and the commitment period lead to a certain persistence in 
the pricing process and state by state partial autocorrelation functions confirm that 
prices are autoregressive of order one. Yet, even if uncorrelated with the current 
error term, the dependent lagged is correlated with past errors and with the de-
meaned residual  , it i ε ε − . Therefore an instrument is needed: this is possible only 
in the GMM specification. The details regarding the instruments used to obtain 
the moment conditions when this second approach is pursued are discussed 
further below. The key implications to be tested are that  2 0 φ < ,  3 0 φ < , and that the 
coefficients attached to Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec, Budget and Industrial are negative. 
Results: OLS.–– The basic results obtained using the OLS within estimator with 
robust standard errors are given in Table 4. Columns 1-3 refer to each of the three 
categories of provision for the whole sample, and columns 4-6 list the estimates 
for the Oil crisis period (1970-1983). The key observation is that the coefficients 
on costs interacted with whether a state elects its regulators or judges are always  
negative. While  3 φ  is always significant at 20 percent or better,  2 φ  is significant in 
columns 4-6, but only for commercial ratepayers in columns 1-3. These results 
                                                 
31 Similarly, the impact of Rev_Door and Jud_Term (which lack within variation) on prices can 
only be assessed by looking at their effect on the pass-through of cost shocks. When I perform this 
exercise, Rev_Door (Jud_Term) tend to increase (decrease) the pass-through. Instead, if I consider 
a dummy equal to one if both commissioners and judges are elected and zero otherwise, it shows 
the expected negative sign but is not significant. The other results are always qualitatively similar.   34
suggest that regulators’ pandering incentives are more powerful, both in an 
absolute sense and with respect to judges, in periods of rising input prices.  
This is clearer when the implied effects are evaluated. Focusing on residential 
rates, the pass-through coefficient for states electing judges rises from roughly 
one half of the coefficient for appointing states in column 1 to three-fourths in 
column 4; and the pass-through coefficient for states electing regulators falls from 
roughly nine-tenth the coefficient for appointing states in column 1 to two-thirds 
in column 4 (which is coherent with evidence in Besley and Coate, 2003). 
A reform toward election also has the general effect of rebalancing rates in favour 
of residential ratepayers at the expenses of business customers. The effect is 
stronger in the judicial case and amounts to a net saving of 4 (7) percentage-price 
points in column 1 (2). Finally, the evidence on Budget and Industrial is mixed: 
while the main predictions are met in columns 1-3, opposite patterns arise in 
columns 4-6. Other controls (not shown) are also often significant but the implied 
impact varies in a non systematic way across the columns.  
The evidence highlights the relevance of both judicial review and the quality of 
information-gathering in explaining prices. Yet, as seen above, regulatory regimes 
are selected nonrandomly, and a relevant determinant of regulatory policies is the 
persistence in pricing choices. Next, I put together these instances and switch to 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. 
Results: GMM difference estimator.–– I use the more efficient two-step procedure 
and always apply the Windmeijer finite-sample correction to the robust standard 
errors in order to avoid downward bias (see Roodman, 2006). I treat the lagged 
price as being predetermined and the fossil fuels cost index (whether or not it is 
interacted with selection rules) as being endogenous. Here, a crucial challenge is   35
to avoid too many instruments. The instruments count tends to explode with the 
number of years T , and too many moment conditions can overfit endogenous 
variables, failing to expunge their endogenous component. Besides, they can also 
weaken the power of the Hansen test for overidentification restrictions (which is 
the consistent one when the standard errors are robust) (see Roodman, 2006). 
Coherently, I gather into the instrument matrix all pricing equation controls  , it X , 
those determinants of selection rule  it z  that can be excluded by the pricing process 
and one (two) lags of the predetermined and endogenous variables when the full 
sample (the Oil crisis period) is considered in columns 1-3 (4-6). Each moment 
condition is collapsed into a single column.
32  
The excluded  it z  are: Ereg_Nei, Ejud_Nei, Aud_Elec and 20th_Jref. A crystal-
clear argument for the exogeneity of the first two is provided by Steiner (2004): 
while the presence of low prices in reforming neighbouring states could shift 
support for reform in state i, electricity rates do not adjust until the reform is 
implemented in statei. For what concerns Aud_Elec and 20th_Jref, there is little 
reason to expect that a general taste for election or technological innovations in 
judicial incentive rules design to have––conditional on the proxies for political 
competition and efficiency of the information-gathering technology––a systematic 
effect on the pricing process. Less clear is a defence of the proxies for the quality 
of institutions and the saliency of regulation (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
Table 5 reports the basic results. The Arellano and Bond (1991) autocovariance 
                                                 
32 This strategy reduces the instrument count well below the number of cross sections: this insures 
against a “too many instruments” failure (see Roodman, 2006). The results remain robust when I 
switch to the one-step estimator or to the system GMM, when I instrument with one more lag of 
the endogenous and predetermined variables, or consider subgroups of the excluded instruments.   36
test does not reject a zero second-order correlation in the differenced residuals at a 
level lower than 0.14, and the Hansen test does not reject the overidentifying 
restrictions at a level lower than 0.17. This reassures about consistency.  
While lagged prices are, over the whole period, the most important covariate, the 
cost index gains a chief role in the inflationary years (columns 4-6). Coherently, 
the role of commissioners becomes key when regulation also becomes more 
salient (because of unexpected cost shocks), and a greater visibility is attached to 
regulatory office-holding with respect to that of other public officials (like 
judges). The impact of judicial election, instead, is stable and huge, implying a 
zero price responsiveness to cost shocks in columns 1-2. Judicial (regulatory) 
election also leads to significant falls in pass-through in columns 4 (6 and 4 at 40 
percent): this confirms, once again, the practice of allowing cross-subsides to 
residential and commercial users at the expenses of business customers.
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6.  Concluding Remarks  
Regulatory institutions are fundamental to economic development, especially in a 
period of deregulation and competition enhancing reforms. Yet the determinants 
of the institutional design of regulated markets are essentially poorly understood: 
here, I developed and tested a model of endogenous regulatory appointment rules. 
                                                 
33 A very similar picture arises when I consider the time-varying controls enumerated in footnote 
23 or binaries for several public benefit programs and performance-based regulation. The evidence 
also remains qualitatively the same when I run separate cross-sectional regressions. For the year 
1996, more detailed measures of average cost are available. In the latter case, estimates of the 
average treatment effect by the Heckman correction or the propensity score confirm the evidence.   37
Given both the intrinsic motivations of public officials and the technological 
environment, political reformers not only consider the comparative advantages of 
different appointment rules but also use them to tie the hands of rival parties.  
Consistent with the model, data from the US electric power market suggest that 
the likelihood of reforms toward regulatory election increases with less abundant 
resources, cheaper electricity generation and harsher political competition. Also, 
electricity rates are lower and respond less to shocks in input costs in states 
electing their top-level regulators or their High Court judges. 
My analysis delivers two pieces of advice for constitutional designers.  
First, in reforming the design of regulatory regimes, it is crucial to assess the 
consequence of appointment rules on the firms’ investment incentives in the light 
of the efficiency of the information-gathering technology and the broad set of 
concerns to which supervisors respond.  
Second, the success of regulatory regime reforms is linked to a Constitutional 
table fully insulated from short-term electoral boosts. 
Despite recent waves of deregulation, most US monopolies are still regulated 
through the settings studied above. Similar institutional designs have recently 
been exported beyond American boundaries as an answer to the rising demand for 
a more effective judicial review and a greater transparency of the regulatory 
process. This institutional trend makes the US lesson an absolutely relevant case 
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6.  Appendix 
6.1 Equilibrium under Perfect Information 
Under perfect information, the planner knows θ  . Maximizing ( ) 2  with respect to U  and 
q, we obtain the following: 
1. The social marginal value of output and its marginal cost are equalized:  
      ()( ) ()( )
** 11 Vq Sq λ λθ ′′ =+ =+         or                      ( )
** Sq p c ′ = = ; 
2. Given the existence of the shadow cost of rewards, no rent is left to the firm: 
             0 U =                                    or                             
** tq θ = .                              ■ 
 
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1 
Let me start from the equilibrium efforts prevailing when supervisors are elected. To this 
extent, maximizing  () ,, , El El ReS  with respect to  , E l e  with  exp
, E l e  taken as given and, then, 
imposing the equilibrium condition  exp
,, ˆE lE l ee = , equilibrium efforts are defined by   42
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , ˆˆ ˆ 11 1 1 0 El El El LHS e SR f e S J K C e αα ′ ⎡⎤ ≡− −−− − ≤ ⎣⎦ ,                               () 2 A  
and by the slackness () ( ) ,, ˆˆ 10 El El eL H S e −=  and  ( ) ,, ˆˆ 0 El El eL H S e = . In the  () { } ,,, ˆ ,, El El El eReS  
space, the first term in  ( ) , ˆE l LHS e  is a rectangular hyperbola centred at  ( ) 0,0  while the 
second term is an increasing function. This, along with the fact that  ( ) 0 C′ <∞ and that  
()
, 1, lim
il ei l Ce → ′ =∞, ensures that 
, ˆE l e  exists and it is both interior and unique. Turning to 
appointed supervisors and following the treatment in Dewatripont et al. (1999), 
equilibrium efforts are implicitly defined by the following first order condition  
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( )
, ,, ,, , ˆˆ ˆ 1E 1 1 1
Al eA l A l A l A l A l SR f e f e S J K C e ξα ξ ⎡⎤ ′ ⎡⎤ −≤ − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
.                          () 3 A  
Again () 3 A  holds as an equality (and thus the slackness conditions are always met).  
The marginal density of the observable conditional on effort  ( ) ,, ˆ Al Al f e ξ  is proportional to  
() ()
2 2 exp
,, , exp 2 Al Al Al ee α ξα σ ⎡⎤ −− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
  if  f  is truncated normal and equal to  ( ) , ˆAl ef α  if  f  is 
one of the other distributions in the relevant class. From the equilibrium condition 
exp
,, Al Al ee = , it follows that  ( ) ( )
, ,, ,, , ˆˆ ˆ E
Al eA l A l A l A l A l f ef e e ξα ξ α ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  
and ( ) 3 A  rewrites as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ˆˆ 11 1 1 Al Al SR e S J K C e α ′ ⎡⎤ −= − − − ⎣⎦ .                                                              () 4 A  
Thus,
 () 2 A  
and  ( ) 4 A  clarify that: 1. elected supervisors exert strictly greater effort than 
appointed ones if  ()1 f α >  (which is always true under A1); 2. Supervisors’ objective 
functions are strictly concave and the following three global comparative statics apply: 
, ˆ 0, iR eR i ∂∂ < ∀ ; 
, ˆ 0, jJ eJ j ∂∂ > ∀ ; 
, ˆ 0, iR eK i ∂ ∂>∀ , 
, ˆ 0, jJ eK j ∂ ∂>∀ .                                  ■ 
 
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2 
Let me first calculate the conditions under which  ( ) ,, ˆˆ 0 iR iR ee ∂Ψ∂ > : 
() () ( )
,, ,
,, , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 1, , 1, 0
SI SI SI
iR iR iR ij q e ij e q ij q e γθ γ θ γθ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ∂− Δ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ Δ +− Δ ∂ ∂ >⇔ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
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iR iR iR iR jJ
e ij q





∂∂ − − −−
.                                         ( ) 5 A  
Applying the implicit function theorem to ( ) 6 , the following holds true: 
( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,, ,
,, , ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 11 1
SI SI SI
iR jJ jJ q e ve V q ve S q λα α θ λλ α α θ ′′ ′′ ⎡⎤ ∂ ∂ = − Γ− Δ = − + Γ− Δ ⎣⎦ . 
Plugging   ,
, ˆ ˆ
SI
iR qe ∂∂  and () 6  
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. 
So, provided that 
, 1 pq ε ≤− , Ψ
 
strictly increases with 
, ˆiR e .  
Regulatory appointment rules, R  and  K  affect Ψ  only through 
, ˆiR e . As a result, under 
A1,
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. 
Therefore, the following inequalities conclude the proof: 
() () ,, ,, , ,
,,,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
0
ˆˆˆ
ER AR ER AR ER AR
iR iR iR
ee ee e e
RR e R e R e R R
∂Ψ ∂Ψ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ ∂Ψ ∂Ψ ∂Ψ
−= − = − < ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
, 
() () ,, ,, , ,
,,,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
0
ˆˆˆ
ER AR ER AR ER AR
iR iR iR
ee ee e e
KK e K e K e K K
∂Ψ ∂Ψ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ ∂Ψ ∂Ψ ∂Ψ
−= − = − > ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
.                                      ■ 
 
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2 
First, notice that the value of  D Ω  
and  R Ω  are respectively 
() D DR R D xx ο ρχ Ω= + −  ,  () ( )( ) 11 R DR R R R x xx ορ μ ρ Ω≡ + − + − .   44
Under A2, they are both negative. Turning to Λ  and Λ, being  0 ′ Γ >
 
, it is clear that, 
from  () 7 ,  Λ (Λ) is the minimum (maximum) value such that the first (second) of the 
following inequalities hold: 
() () () { } () () ,, , ,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ max ,
SS
ER AR D R AR ER We We v e e ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −Γ Λ > Ω Ω Ψ − Ψ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
%% ,  , R K ∀ ; 
() () () { } ()() ,, , ,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ min ,
SS
ER AR D R AR ER We We v e e ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −Γ Λ < Ω Ω Ψ − Ψ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
%% ,  , R K ∀ . 
By the same token, the values of Λ
 
for which the impact of a change in R  and K  has a 
greater effect on the dynamic efficiency part of the reformer’s utility than on the static 
efficiency bit are the maximum values of Λ
 
such that, respectively: 
() () { }
, ,, ,,
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Clearly enough, 
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  , R K ∀ , 
which is always the case under the second inequality in point 2 of A2. The latter also 
implies that  D Ω  
and  R Ω  are different and, therefore,  Λ <Λ<Λ . Thus, for Λ<Λ<Λ 
either appointment or election can be selected and the comparative statics with respect to 
Λ,  R  and  K  hold by inspection of ( ) 7  
and by Lemma 2 (which, indeed, ensures that 
( ) ( ) ,, ˆˆ 0 ER AR eR eR ∂Ψ ∂ −∂Ψ ∂ <  and  ( ) ( ) ,, ˆˆ 0 ER AR eK eK ∂Ψ∂ − ∂ Ψ∂ > ). Also, because  D Ω  
and 
R Ω  are not comparable under the parameter restrictions in A2, the statement about the 
reformer’s identity is true. Finally, a rise in  m x%  makes more difficult that election is 
preferred because both  D D x ∂Ω ∂ and  R R x ∂Ω∂ are negative under A2. Indeed,  
() 10 DD R x ορ ∂Ω ∂ = − < ,   ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 11 1 1 1 0 RR R R R x ορ μ ρ ρ ο μ ∂ Ω∂= −−+ −= − − − <.       ■   45
 
6.5 Data 
The data set gathers observations for 49 states over the period 1970–1997. Only a few 
data points are available for the District of Columbia, and no IOUs serve Nebraska. 
1. Data on regulatory selection rules, revolving-door restrictions on commissioners, 
bipartisanship requirements, total budget and the year the public utility commission was 
founded and whether it was constitutionally formed are collected from: 
A. PUCs’ web pages; B. NARUC, 1970–1997. Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies. 
NARUC, Washington DC; C. Beecher, J. A., 2007. Historical Names and Dates of the 
Public Service Commissions. Mimeo: Michigan State University. 
2. Data on judicial selection rules, office terms and the year the state joined the Union are 
collected from: A. Hanssen (2004b), Table 1; B. Besley and Payne (2005), Table 1.  
3. Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks: 
CSG, 1970–1997. The Book of the States. CSG, Lexington, KY. 
4. Data on sales, revenue, generation shares and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per 
net Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook: 
A. EEI, 1995. 1960–1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry; B. EEI, 
1993–1997. Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry. Washington, DC: EEI. 
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA, 
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and 
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Residential, commercial and industrial users 
account for 95 percent of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy 
for generation in two types of breakdown–that is, by type of prime mover driving the 
generator and by energy source. The totals from both of these are consistent. I used the 
second one, except for generation by hydro (see also Besley and Coate, 2003). Prices are 
calculated from revenues and sales in terms of cents per Kwh.   
5. Let 
ijt s and
ijt q be the share and price of input  j (coal, gas, oil) used in state i and year t.     46
So, if 
, i t ijt ijt it j pq p q ≡∑  
is the average (composite) price of fossil fuels per net Kwh for 
state i in year t, then the cost index is defined as 
, it i t i t cs p ≡ . 
6. Data on state auditor selection rules come from: Schelker, M., 2007. Public Auditors: 
Empirical Evidence from the US States. Mimeo, University of Fribourg. 
7. State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5–17 
are calculated from a US Census Bureau (UCB) publication: 










Table 1: History of Appointment Rules, 1970–1997. 
Judicial selection rules 
Jud_Elec [21]: 
AL[Pe], AR[Pe], GA[Pe/Ne(1984–)], ID[Ne], IL[Pe], KY[Ne], LA[Pe/Ne(1976–)], MI[Ne], 
MN[Ne], MS[Pe/Ne(1994–)], MT[Ne], NV[Ne], NC[Pe], ND[Ne], OH[Ne], OR[Ne], PA[Pe], 
TX[Pe], WA[Ne], WV[Pe], WI[Ne]   
Jud_App  [20]: 
AK[Mp], CA[Ga],  CO[Mp], CT[Ga], DE[Ga], HI[Mp], IN[Mp], IA[Mp], KS[Mp], ME[Ga], 
MA[Ga], MO[Mp], NH[Ga], NJ[Ga], OK[Mp], RI[La/ Ga(1994–)], SC[La], UT[Mp], 
VT[La/Ga(1984–)], VA[La] 
Switching  [8]:  AZ[Ne/Mp(1974–)], FL[Pe/Mp(1972–)], MD[Ne/Mp(1976–)],NM[Pe/Mp(1989–)], 
NY[Pe/Ga(1978–)], SD[Ne/Mp(1981–)], TN[Pe/Mp(1994–)], WY[Ne/Mp(1973–)]
Regulatory selection rules 
Reg_Elec   [9]:  AL [E], AZ [E], GA[E], LA[E], MS[E], MT[E], ND[E], OK[E], SD[E] 
Reg_App  [35]: 
 
AK[Gal], AR[Ga], CA[Gas], CO[Gas], CT[Gal], DE[Gas], HI[Gas], ID[Gas], IL[Gas], 
IN[Ga], IA[Ga], KS[Gas], KY[Ga], ME[Gas], MD[Gas], MA[Ga], MI[Gas], MO[Ga], 
NV[Ga], NH[Gae], NJ[Gas], NM[Ga], NY[Gas], NC[GA], OH[Gas], OR[Ga], PA[Gas], 
RI[Gas], UT[Gas], VT[Ga], VA[Le], WA[Gas], WV[Gas], WI[Gas], WY[Gas] 
Switching   [5]:  FL[E/Gas(1981–)], MN[E(1960–1971)/Ga(1972–1975)/ E(1976–1977)/Ga(1978–)], 
SC[Le/E(1996–)], TN[E/GAa(1996–)], TX[E/Ga(1977–)] 
Notes:  1. In the judicial rules panel, the acronimous Pe, Ne, Ga, La and Mp stand for partisan election,  
                nonpartisan election, appointment by Governor, appointment by Legislature, and merit plan.  
            2. In the regulatory selection rule panel, the acronimous E, Ga, Gas, Gae, Gal, GAa, Le stand for direct  
                election, appointment by Governor, appointment by Governor with confirmation by the Senate,   
                appointment by Governor with confirmation by executive council, appointment by Governor with  
                approval by legislature, selection by general assembly and selection by Legislature.  
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  Table 2: Variables Names and Descriptions. 
       











Reg_Ord:  Dummy variable taking value 3 if commissioners are elected by voters; 1 if 
they are appointed with the approval by both houses; 2 otherwise. 
2.118 
[0.555] 
Jud_Elec:  Dummy variable taking value 1 if High Court judges are elected; 0 otherwise.   0.485 
[0.500] 
Jud_Ord:  Dummy variable taking value 3 if High Court judges are selected through 






Rev_Door:  Dummy variable taking value 1 if there is a time restriction on commissioners 
working for the regulated industry once they have left the PUC; 0 otherwise. 
0.653 
[0.476] 
Bipartisan:  Dummy variable taking value 1 appointed commissioners cannot all be from 
the same party; 0 otherwise. 
0.224 
[0.417] 




Budget:  PUC’s total receipts in thousands of dollars.  12057.37 
[26991.38] 
Industrial:  Percentage of total revenue from sales to customers that are industrial.  0.288 
[0.097] 
Prices 
Price_R:  Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to residential users.  5.918 
[2.680] 
Price_C:  Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to commercial users.  5.528 
[2.435] 
Price_I:  Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to industrial users.  3.810 
[1.925] 





Gen_Hydro:  Percentage of total generation from hydroelectric sources.  0.198 
[0.317] 
Oil_Ref: 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the state changed the commissioners’ 





Majority:  Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by the 
majority party.  
0.669 
[0.129] 
Rep:  Dummy variable taking value 1 if both houses are controlled (with the 








Ereg_Nei:  Share of neighbouring states electing public utility commissioners.   0.234 
[0.271] 
Ejud_Nei:  Share of neighbouring states electing their High Court judges.   0.516 
[0.319] 
PUC_Fou:  Year the PUC was founded.  1891.531 
[23.011] 
Join:  Year the state joined the Union.  1839.245 
[47.598] 
Aud_Elec:  Dummy variable taking value 1 if state auditors are elected; 0 otherwise.  0.327 
[0.470] 










Gen_Nucl:  Percentage of total generation from nuclear sources.  0.144 
[0.194] 
Pop: State  population.  4,744,061 
[5,050,415] 
Old:  Percentage of population aged 65 and over.  0.110 
[0.031] 
Young:  Percentage of population aged 5–17.  0.204 
[0.049] 
GSP:  Gross state product per capita, in dollars.  12148.88 
[7306.264] 















  (1) (2) (3)
  Reg_Ord = 3  Reg_Ord = 1  Reg_Ord  Jud_Ord 
Rev_Door  0.013 
           [0.023] 
– 0.001 
  [0.002] 
– 0.121 
  [0.190]   
Bipartisan           – 0.182 
      [0.017]*** 
  0.020 
        [0.005]*** 
             – 1.166 
       [0.149]***   







   [0.018] 
Budget           – 2.86e
-06 
         [0.00000]***
  – 7.38e
-08 




         [1.55e
-06]*** 
      5.41e
-06 
           [1.97e
-06]***
Industrial              0.335 
      [0.083]*** 
          – 0.080 
       [0.012]*** 
3.880 
              [0.643]*** 
  1.667 
       [0.560]*** 
Gen_Hydro  0.036 
[0.027]
† 




     [0.195]*** 
  0.839 
       [0.202]*** 
Oil_Ref  – 0.077 
       [0.012]*** 
          – 0.058 
       [0.009]*** 
            – 0.361 
 [0.301]   
Majority   0.082 
 [0.066] 
 0.021 
      [0.008]*** 
            – 0.381 
[0.563] 
  2.518 
      [0.462]*** 
Rep            – 0.015 
 [0.015] 
  0.0003 
  [0.0015] 




Ereg_Nei   0.415 
      [0.060]*** 
0.029 
      [0.005]*** 
2.627 
     [0.372]***   
Ejud_Nei       0.910 
     [0.156]*** 
PUC_Fou      0.00005 
   [0.0003] 
  0.0004 
         [0.00006]***
           – 0.020 
   [0.002]***   
Join     0.0003 
    [0.0002]*
         – 0.0001 
       [0.00003]***
              0.006 
   [0.002]*** 
         – 0.018 
    [0.002]***
Aud_Elec            – 0.080 
      [0.014]*** 
         – 0.0063 
      [0.0015]*** 
              0.081 
            [0.138] 
            0.008 
[0.132] 
PUC_Con  0.190 
      [0.064]*** 
 0.0002 
          [0.002] 
              0.630 
 [0.258]**   
20th_Jref                – 2.393 
    [0.200]*** 
Gen_Nucl           – 0.130 
   [0.057]** 
           0.035 
    [0.006]*** 
          – 3.060 
   [0.375]*** 
        – 0.267 
          [0.284] 
Estimation  Multinomial Logit  Ordered Logit  Ordered Logit 
Number of Observations  1372               1372  1372 
Pseudo R
2   0.37             0.18 0.25
PseudoLogLikelihood                         – 712.590        – 929.294      – 1061.656 
Notes: 1. The entries of the columns in panel (1) are estimated marginal effects; 
          2. Robust standard errors  (z distribution) in parentheses;    
            3. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; 





Table 4: Pass-Through of Cost Shocks, Fixed Effects (Within) Estimator. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Price_R  Price_C  Price_I  Price_R  Price_C  Price_I 
Reg_Elec  – 0.210 
   [0.203] 
0.312 
  [0.195]* 
     – 0.025 







Jud_Elec  – 0.235 
    [0.175]
† 
       – 0.362 
   [0.179]** 
        0.178 
       [0.130]
† 
      – 0.140 
[0.144] 
     – 0.347 
   [0.164]** 




   0.502 
        [0.075]*** 
          0.531 
    [0.073]*** 
        0.476 
  [0.079]*** 
0.857 
       [0.069]***
         0.846 
     [0.074]*** 
         0.860 
    [0.058]*** 
Reg_Elec*c         – 0.028 
   [0.083] 
      – 0.175 
         [0.081]** 
    – 0.038      
       [0.060] 
      – 0.279 
      [0.068]*** 
     – 0.219 
    [0.076]*** 
     – 0.180 
    [0.058]*** 
Jud_Elec*c         – 0.238 
        [0.081]*** 
      – 0.189 
[0.077]**
    – 0.160 
 [0.058]***
      – 0.195 
     [0.075]***
    – 0.100 
      [0.078]
† 
     – 0.168 
   [0.059]***
Budget         – 1.55e
-06 
         [8.27e
-07]* 
      – 1.35e
-06 
    [8.34e
-07]* 
    – 2.88e
-06 
      [7.28e
-07]***
    3.79e
-06 
    [6.51e
-06] 




       [4.01e
-06]***
Industrial         – 2.523 
        [0.629]*** 
          0.548 
        [0.681] 
        0.324 
       [0.496] 
         0.556 
        [0.667] 
        2.480 
  [0.679]*** 
        2.755 
       [0.591]*** 
Other Controls     Majority, Rep, Gen_Hydro, Gen_Nucl, Pop, Pop
2, Old, Young, GSP, GSP
2, time dummies. 
Estimation     Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator. 
Number of  
Observations  1372 1372 1372 686 686 686 
R
2  (within)  0.91  0.90  0.89 0.95 0.93 0.95 
Notes:   1. Robust standard errors in parentheses; 








Table 5: Pass-Through of Cost Shocks, Difference GMM Estimator. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
  Price_R Price_C Price_I Price_R Price_C  Price_I 
Lagged Dependent 
0.898 
      [0.141]*** 
0.672 
      [0.185]*** 
0.952 




      – 0.092 
         [0.270] 
       0.198 











      [0.204]*** 
1.473 
      [0.563]*** 
      1.071 
    [0.273]***
Reg_Elec*c 






      – 0.354 
[0.407] 
      – 0.343 
[0.397] 
  – 0.346 
     [0.318]
^ 
Jud_Elec*c        – 0.334 
  [0.185]* 
      – 0.513 
   [0.260]**
      – 0.168 
[0.185]
      – 0.300 
[0.290]
^
     – 0.285 
        [0.434] 
   – 0.017 
    [0.316]
Budget 
   6.11e
-07 
   [2.34e
-06] 
      – 9.71e
-07 
   [2.26e
-06] 
   5.49e
-07 
   [1.72e
-06] 
   0.00001 




   [9.76e
-06] 




Industrial            1.701 
 [1.187]
† 
          2.560 
  [1.542]* 
         4.665 
[2.748]* 
         0.936 
        [1.118] 
         1.539 
[1.377]
^ 
      2.836 
    [2.418]
^ 
Other Controls       Majority, Rep, Gen_Hydro, Gen_Nucl, Pop, Old, Young, GSP, time dummies.
 
Estimation       Fixed time and state effects twostep difference GMM. 
Predetermined       Lagged dependent variable. 
Endogenous       One lag of predetermined and endogenous, c,  
     Reg_Elec*c, Jud_Elec*c. 
    Two lags of predetermined and endogenous, c, 
    Reg_Elec*c, Jud_Elec*c. 
Instruments (collapsed)       Ereg_Nei, Ejud_Nei, Aud_Elec, 20th_Jref. 
Instruments  count 44 44 44 34 34  34 
Autocov.  of  order  2  0.21 0.83 0.14 0.14 0.79  0.39 
Hansen Test for  
Overid. Restrict.  0.55 0.17 0.31 0.67 0.32  0.66 
Number  of  Observations  1274 1274 1274  588  588  588 
Notes:   1. Windmeijer corrected robust standard errors in parentheses; 
              2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; 
†, 20%; 
^, 30%. 
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